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Introduction 
 
In the last ten years economic literature has produced numerous works to explain 
Italy’s withdraws from the Exchange rate Mechanism (ERM) in the 1992, when fixed 
parity was abandoned and the exchange rate was left free to fluctuate.  
 
In fact, prevalent models give only a partial explanation of the events, in the sense 
that, although they identify the variables on the basis of which operators formulate 
their decisions, they assume the hypothesis that expectations are either adaptive or 
rational. In any case, it seems that the events of that period can be regarded from 
another perspective in order to bring out, with greater clarity, the variables which 
determinate the course of the exchange rate1.  
 
Following the contribution of De Grauwe (2000) we intend to take a different route. 
We assume that expectations are not formulated on the basis of analytical evaluations 
of the behaviour of the economic authorities, but rather they may be understood as 
rational beliefs founded on market sentiment. The rational beliefs are formed in the 
market on the basis of the observation of events and intuitions regarding the future 
course of the market and they might wind up determining the monetary authorities’ 
policies. This intuitions is based on the idea that probability which is assigned by 
agents to the realization of future events is not strictly quantifiable nor necessarily 
based on the analytic representation that is given by the authorities, but rather is the 
result of a rational complex process based on the observation of those variables 
which, at that time are considered to be relevant. 
 
From the empirical analysis we explain how operators determined the abandonment 
of the fixed parity. Furthermore the intervention of the Central Bank sets to defend the 
value of the exchange rate were made useless since the variables observed by agents 
gave indication contrary to those used by the authorities for the control of the external 
value of money.  
 
                                                 
1 For more information see P. Del Giovane (1994), L. Bini Smaghi  O. Tristani (1995)  and P. G. 
Hopper (1997). 
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The work is organized as follows: in the second section recent contribution to the 
explanation of the currency crises will be briefly examined to show how our report 
may be included in the context. In section three the model is presented in its 
theoretical and econometric form. Conclusions are presented in the final section. 
 
 
The evolution of currency crises models: an overview.  
 
The framework in which the models of currency crisis are included is the monetary 
approach to the balance of payment. It has origins that may be traced back to Mundell 
(1968, 1971), and Johnson (1972)2, latter evaluated further by the contributions of 
Dornbush (1976), Frenkel (1976) and Bilson (1978). There are two groups that maybe 
referred to for the simplicity of their models explaining the currency crisis: the first is 
the ‘Krugman group’3 –which identifies the cause of abandonment of parity in the 
exhaustion of currency reserves- and second is the ‘Kydland and Prescott group’4 –
according to whom the economic authorities try to maximise a utility function or 
minimise a loss function. Based on this the Central Bank would regulate whether to 
keep or to adjust the band of fluctuation of the exchange rate5.  
 
The models that follow the path outlined by Krugman’s contribution identify the main 
causes of the evaluation in the mismanagement of fiscal and monetary policy. In fact, 
the excessive budget deficit and the consequent excess of public debt called for a 
tighter monetary policy (i.e. an increase in the interest rate). This increased the 
probability for a monetization of the debt, determining higher inflation expectations 
by the operators. This latter circumstance had induced financial speculators to convert 
national currency to foreign currency in the belief that the latter would be able to hold 
its internal value constant. The exchange rate regime forced the Central Bank to back 
up these requests, exhaust its own stock of reserves available and guarantee 
international lines of credit. The prolonged use of the reserves would, at the end, 
                                                 
2 These authors linked the conclusions they reached using open market models with the monetary 
models made by Friedman (1956), and Patinkin (1956). 
3   Krugman (1979 e 1991), Buiter (1987) are good examples of this approach. 
4 See also Kydland e Prescott (1977) and Obstfeld (1986 a e b). 
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determine the abandonment of fixed exchange rate and the choice of a regime of 
flexibility. The Bank of Italy in the attempt to oppose inflationary expectations in 
those years adhered to a tighter monetary policy but this behaviour seems to confirm 
the idea proposed in these models that the dimensions of fiscal imbalances were 
unsustainable, and sooner or later the monetary authorities should have printed 
money. 
 
The economic literature that examines the second stream of analysis support the idea 
that is always possible to preserve an adequate portion of the reserves and that the 
main cause of the abandonment of the exchange rate is identifiable in a conflict 
among the objectives of the economic policy. In fact, the authorities have not only the 
responsibility of managing fixed parity but also that of maximizing a utility function 
(e.g. the growth of income) or minimizing a loss function. According to this point of 
view it would have been more important (e.g. in the currency crises in 1992), to avoid 
a recession with high unemployment rate –caused by mismanagement of fiscal policy 
than to maintain the regime of fixed exchange rate. Therefore, the Bank of Italy 
preferred to maintain a single objective function, which was considered of primary 
importance in its choices. These decisions would be determined by the circumstance 
that the agents had rational expectation; and that, namely, they were able to predict 
that the balance between the credibility of monetary policy and the costs in preserving 
it had become unbearable. 
 
Both groups of models provide an interesting indication regarding an explanation of 
currency crisis, but it is possible, however, to identify some limits that restrict their 
ability to explain the events. The first group, in fact, do not consider the effect 
induced and the social costs generated by the commitment of the authorities to defend 
the level of exchange rate. Further, focusing only on the role of the official reserves 
and on the behaviour of the speculators put in second place the choices of the other 
agents and the effect on growth and employment. The second group assumes that the 
economic agents are rational in forming their expectations and they have perfect 
knowledge of the Central Bank economic model. If it had been so in those years, the 
perseverance of the Bank of Italy to control the quantity of money through 
                                                                                                                                            
5 The main theoretical contributions are Jeanne (1995) and Spadafora (1999). Tronzano (2001) made a 
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movements in interest rate would have excluded real effects and been sufficient to 
preserve the fixed exchange rate.  
 
Diverging from the previous analysis, our model underlines the importance of the role 
of the speculators in determining the exchange rate, and the effects that the policy of 
maintaining external parity has on internal growth. It proposes, however, a different 
way through which expectations are formed about the macroeconomic fundamentals 
independently of the behaviour of the monetary policy.  
 
In other words, the usual relationship of causality between monetary policy actions 
and expectations of the exchange rate would have been inverted at that time. The 
behaviour of the Bank of Italy was influenced by the beliefs of the market agents. 
 
 
The Theoretical Model 
 
In the previous paragraph we underline the central role of expectations in determining 
the abandonment of parity. The first group of models, in fact, indicate the importance 
of the expected value of currency, while the second one underlines, on the other hand, 
the importance of the expected future income.  
 
In our model, besides considering both expected values, we intend to show the 
direction of causality from the formation of expectations of the exchange rate and 
income towards the conduct of monetary policy; so that the formulation of widespread 
beliefs on market sentiments would have end up determining the sequence of events in 
the currency crisis of 1992.  
 
The analysis of the market sentiment model can be developed in two faces: in the first, 
we try to identify analytically the components that embodied market sentiments; in the 
second we develop a quantitative analysis that allows a study of the influence of 
rational beliefs on the exchange rate market and points out the direction of causality 
indicated previously.  
                                                                                                                                            
similar approach. 
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In order to model the market sentiment we need to define how economic agents form 
their expectations. Let us, therefore, assume that there are N economic agents and J 
fundamental variables and their expectations can be formally expressed as: 
 
, 1 , 1
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i t j t
i j
N
i t
i
zϖ
ϖ
+ +
= =
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=
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∑
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Where “ iϖ ” is the probability that each operator assign to the verification of a certain 
events, or rational beliefs on the basis of market sentiments and , 1j tz +  is the 
fundamental variable to which the probability is attached. The intuition behind the 
rational beliefs can be found on Keynes’ Treatise of Probability (1920, p.3-4), where 
he wrote: 
 
“All propositions are true or false, but the knowledge of them depends 
on our circumstances; and while it is often convenience to speak of 
propositions as certain or probable, this expresses strictly a relationship 
in which they stand to a corpus of knowledge, actual or hypothetical 
and not a characteristic of the propositions in themselves. […] The 
theory of probability is logical, therefore, because it is concerned, with 
the degree of belief which it is rational to entertain in given conditions, 
and not merely with actual beliefs of particular individuals which may 
or may not be rational.” 
 
One of the straightforward applications of the above statement is that that exchange 
rates could be determined by how economic agents perceive the information and on 
the importance attached to this, in relation with the market sentiment and the 
macroeconomic model used. Then, on the basis of the perceptions of events, each 
economic agent will formulate his/her own choices. This in turn, will tend to be 
confirmed in a “self-fulfilling” view of expectations. Thus the expected final value 
represents the interpretation of the future value of the fundamentals on the basis of the 
market sentiment prevalent on that moment. Under this view, the exchange rate can be 
seen as the result of a self-fulfilling process as shown in graph 1.  
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Graph 1: Self-fulfilling Economic Process 
 
 
 
Given the great availability of information, we start from the assumption that 
exchange rate market is efficient. Although this might be a strong assumption, in our 
view the market processes and uses all the information available in the best way. This 
does not mean that we eliminate the forecasting error, but this is the result of the 
market sentiment. In other words the error could have a systematic component. In 
order to examine the exchange rate movement, we can write: 
 
( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1| |t t t t t t t t t te e I Z Z Iβ ε+ + + + + += Ε + −Ε +    (2) 
 
Where et+1 is the exchange rate at period t+1; E(et+1) represents the expected value of 
the exchange rate given the set of information I available at time t. in other words that 
component anticipated by market agents (It); [Zt+1 – Et(Zt+1|It)]  represent the news or 
surprises that are tied to variation of fundamental variables (Z); finally et+1 is the error 
term following a white noise process. The set of information at time “t” is composed 
of the historical series of the fundamental variables prominent in the previous period, 
It = (Zt-n,..Zt-i,....Zt).   
 
As just described, the aspect that is important for the purposes of the analysis of the 
market sentiment is given by the value of the coefficients, in our case “β” of Eq. (2). 
 
Macroeconomic 
Models 
Information 
Agents’ Beliefs 
Market Sentiment 
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To be able to capture the dynamics of the parameters of the model we start writing 
Eq. (2) in its state space form. The state-space representation can, then, be used to 
compute the estimates of a state vector for t = k + 1; k + 2; :::; T using the Kalman 
filter. This recursive algorithm, in fact, computes the linear lest square of the 
forecasted state vector given data observed at time t.  To illustrate the evolution of the 
coefficients, we estimated a time-varying parameters (TVP) model of the following 
form in compact matrix notation: 
 
t t te β µ= +Z  (transition equation) (3) 
 
1t t tFβ β η−= +  (measurement equation) (4) 
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The Zt matrix, of dimension (Txk), contains the fundamental variable. We now have 
the state vector βt, a (kx1) vector that contains all the slope coefficients, which are 
now varying through time. The F matrix, of dimension (kxk), contains the 
autoregressive coefficients of βt. We allow the coefficient βt to follow a random walk 
process. The error terms are assumed to be independent white noise 
( ) ;   ( ) ;     ( ) 0t s t sVar Q Var R Varµ η µη= = =  for all t and s. 
 
For each endogenous variables of the model it is therefore possible to observe how the 
respective coefficients are changing over time by the effect of changing in the market 
judgment. If we calculate for every coefficient the first difference, we can quantify 
how the market sentiments are modified by each independent variable.  
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Eq. (6) expresses how the weight has changed in successive times, attributed and 
deduced by the market, relative on the expectations of the i-inth variable. This 
represents another component of the market sentient.  
 
 
Empirical Analysis 
 
The choice of the model was based underneath to include among the main variables 
considered those that where able to determine variations in the expectations of the 
Italian Lira/ Deutschland Mark exchange rate for the time period under investigation. 
In fact, it is on these variables that economic agents form their expectations 
representing the core of the analysis. 
 
The model is composed of two parts. In the first we precede to the estimation of the 
Kalman Filter how presented in the previous paragraph. In the second, on the basis of 
the indication given by the estimates of Eq. (1), we make a forecast of the exchange 
rate for the period 1990:01-1992:09. This allows us to support the main idea that 
market fundamentals followed by the economic agents where different from those 
considered by the Central Bank. 
 
Following De Grawe (2000) and Corsetti (2000) we decide to include in our set of 
fundamentals the differentials between Italy and Germany of the expected value of the 
output growth and of inflation, the differential of the interest rate and the money 
supply6. 
 
The model can be represented in its state space form by the following equations: 
 
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 2t t t t t t t t t t tS b b EDIFIP b EDIFINF b DIFINT b DIFM ξ= + + + + +  (6) 
                                                 
6 We tested for the inclusion of other macroeconomic variables, but none of them appeared to be 
significant, therefore they where dropped from the analysis. 
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ttt
bb ,4..,1,0,4..,1,01,4..1,0 ϑ+=+  (7) 
 
In Eq. (6) the variables for the period 1987:4-1996:12 are constructed as the follow7. 
St is the log of the exchange rate Italian Lira- Deutschland Mark; EDIFIP is the 
differential of the expected value of the annual rate of growth between the Italy and 
Germany; EDIFINF is the differential of the expected value of the annual inflation 
rate. These two variables have been constructed following and AR(n) process 
regressing output growth/inflation on a constant and on its own values in the previous 
periods. DIFINT is the difference of the monthly Eurolira and Euromark interest rate; 
DIFM2 represents the difference of the rate of growth of the money supply measured 
as M28.  
 
Figs. A-D in Figure 2 represents the evolution of the coefficients estimated in Tab. 1 
for the period under investigation. On the other hand, the graphic analysis indicates 
how the weights (i.e. the pattern of the coefficients) of the differential of expected rate 
of growth of income and inflation are diverging from their trend at the end of the 
1991. On the other hand, the coefficients of the variables in Fig. 2C and Fig. 2B show 
a persistent stability for the entire period of time except in proximity of the September 
1992 crisis. This leads us to consider that the market operators used fundamental 
variables like EDIFIP and EDIFINF as a base to carry out their expectations of the 
exchange rate. Contrarily, the behaviour of the coefficients of DIFINT and DIFM2 
seems to be more consistent with the fundamentals followed by the Central Bank. 
From the results of the estimated model, it appears that operators used a more 
restricted series of variables, such as EDIFIP and EDIFINF, to carry out their forecast. 
On these two, agents seem to have almost totally omitted other fundamental variables 
that, according to economic theory, should have been taken into account. On the basis 
of the indications provided by the estimation of the Eq. (6) and from the analysis of 
the coefficients in Figure 1, we precede to the estimation of the followings equations9: 
 
                                                 
7 All data are from the IMF-Financial Statistics collected by DATASTREAM. Plots of the variables are 
presented in appendix, figure 1. 
8 The plot of the explanatory variable is presented in the Appendix, Figure 1. 
9 S:E: in parenthesis. 
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6.821561 9.101297 -17.18452EDIFINF+t t tS EDIFIP ε= +  (8)  
 (0.0243) (1.6781) (3.6411) 
 
6.689 0.092
       (0.032)  (0.047)
t t tS DIFINT e= + +  (9)  
  
The first equation tells us that only on these variables previously identified as 
fundamental variables in determining the market sentiment have been considered as 
variable explicative of the exchange rate. The results are presented in Table 2. On the 
basis of the Eq. (8) we then proceed to make a prediction of the dependent variable 
for the period 1990:1-1992:09. The shaded area in Figure 3 shows the course of the 
nominal exchange rate and that predicted by the rational beliefs of market agents. The 
“S” curve describes the course of the exchange rate for the period examined. It is 
worth to note, the bifurcation of the expected rate and the actual value is seen around 
the end of 1991, about a year before the crisis. The model tells us that, despite the fact 
that monetary authorities considered more important to maintain a policy of strong 
exchange rate (that is, to avoid a realignment in the system as established by the 1979 
agreement), agents carried on forming their expectations in an even more self-
fulfilling way. As the time went on agents become convinced that the Italian Lira was 
suffering from an appreciation in real term and that the differential of income would 
keep increasing, an even ever greater divergence was determined. 
 
In Eq. (9) we include the different in interest rate as explanatory variable of the 
nominal interest rate. We, consider this as the main indicator that the Central Bank 
followed during that period. Figure 4 present the in sample forecast for the period 
1990:1-1992:09. From the analysis of the two forecasts we can assert, as mentioned 
earlier, that the line of causality of the exchange rate during early nineties goes from 
the agents’ beliefs to Bank of Italy behaviour and not vice versa. 
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Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have reached the following conclusions. Firstly, not all the variables 
included in the structural model contribute to the determination of the pattern of the 
exchange rate. In fact, from the econometric estimates it is clear that only the 
differential in income growth and inflation has a decisive role in the abandonment of 
the parity. Money supply and interest rate had no significant role in determining the 
upward pressure on the exchange rate, and this explain why the policy followed the 
Central Bank did not have any effect. Secondly, expectations on the differential of the 
output growth and inflation between Italy and Germany were the real determinants of 
the expected value of the exchange rate. Thirdly, the expected value of the exchange 
rate made on the basis of the wide-spread beliefs of the income growth and inflation 
ended up determining the value of exchange rate.  
 
It can also be confirmed that, in the present model, the agents’ rational beliefs do not 
emerge from arbitrary circumstances but only when the value of the exchange rate, 
kept under control by the central bank (this was the case of Italy for the period 
1990:01-1992:09), did not correspond to the expected value and to the current wide-
spread beliefs in the market. Moreover, on one hand, the Italian economy at that time 
lost its attraction for foreign investors and this certainly helped to reinforce a 
prevalent negative opinion about future value of the exchange rate. On the other hand, 
the depreciation of the fundamentals paved the way for speculation for which the 
exact moment was determined by the market sentiment.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1: Estimate Eq.(6) 
 Periodo: 1987:04 1996:12 
Variables Coefficients 
COSTANT 6.728930*** 
EDIFIP  9.747656*** 
EDIFINF -25.81251*** 
DIFINT 0.217487*** 
DFM2 -6.890151*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.422872 
S.E. of regression 0.127380 
Note: *, **, *** rappresent the significance level at 10, 5 and 1 percent. 
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Figure 1. Plot of the variables 
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Figure 2: Behaviour of the coefficients in (7) 
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Figure 3: Agents’ Forecast  
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Figure 4: Central Bank’s Forecast 
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